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1 INTRODUCTION
Models characterized by the presence of increasing returns to scale, monopolistic
competition, and trade costs typically give rise to what has become known as the
Home Market Effect after Krugman (1980) and Helpmand and Krugman (1985).
The Home Market Effect (HME) is defined as a more-than-proportional relationship
between a country’s share of world production of a good and its share of world
demand for the same good. Thus, a country whose share of world demand for a
good is larger than average will have - ceteris paribus - a more than proportionally
larger-than-average share of world production of that good.1 The HME is so closely
associated to the presence of increasing returns to scale (IRS) and monopolistic
competition (MC) that it has been used as a discriminating criterion to testing trade
theory in a novel approach pioneered by Davis and Weinstein (1999, 2003). Since
then, as it will be discussed below, further theoretical and empirical research has
explored the robustness of the HME and has searched for additional discriminating
criteria.
One pervasive assumption in the literature to date is that of the presence of a
good freely traded and produced under constant returns to scale (CRS) and per-
fect competition (PC). This good is often referred to as the “outside good”. The
presence of the outside good serves two purposes. First, it guarantees factor price
equalization, thereby improving grandly the mathematical tractability of models.
Second, it offsets all trade imbalances in the IRS-MC good, thereby permitting in-
ternational specialization. A different way of seeing the second point is that the
outside good accommodates all changes in labor demand caused by the expansion
or contraction of the IRS-MC sector, thereby allowing for the reaction of production
to demand in the latter sector to be more than proportional. The assumption of
the existence of a freely traded CRS-PC good is as much convenient as it is at odds
with reality. As noted by Head and Mayer (2004, p. 2634) when discussing this
issue in their comprehensive account of the literature:“. . . the CRS sector probably
does not have zero trade costs or the ability to absorb all trade imbalances.” The
pervasive use of the outside good assumption and its inconsistency with reality raise
1An alternative definition of the HME often used in the literature is that a country whose share
of demand for a good is larger than average will be a net exporter of that good. In this paper
we will always refer to the HME as the more than proportional relationship between the share of
production and the share of demand.
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the question of what are the consequences of its removal on the HME. The present
paper investigates this question.
We eliminate the outside good from the main model used in the empirical lit-
erature on the HME. This model, in two different variants, has been used in Davis
and Weinstein (1999, 2003) and in Head and Ries (2001). We find that, in general,
the HME survives when the outside good is absent but its average magnitude is
attenuated. More interestingly, both variants of the model predict a non-linear re-
lationship between the production share and the demand share. The non-linearity
is characterized by a tenuous HME (or absence thereof) when countries’ demand
shares are not too different from the world average. The HME becomes stronger
when countries’ demand share become more dissimilar. We put this result to em-
pirical verification on a data set containing 25 countries, 25 industries and 7 years.
The non-linearity predicted by both models is strongly present in the data. One
interesting consequence of the non-linearity is that the HME is more important for
countries whose magnitude of demand shares is very different from the average than
for countries whose demand shares are closer to the average. Performing a test of
structural change with unknown breakpoints shows indeed that the HME matters
only for the largest and smallest demand share, accounting for about one fifth of the
observations in the sample. For the remaining observations, the HME is of negligible
importance or totally absent.
As for the CRS-PC sectors, the model shows that the less-than-proportional re-
lationship between share of production and share of demand survives the absence of
an outside good. This result, combined with the more than proportional relationship
between share of production and share of demand in the IRS-MC industry, confirms
the theoretical validity of the HME as a discriminating criterion to test trade the-
ories even in the absence of an outside good. The empirical investigation in this
paper finds little evidence of sectors exhibiting a less than proportional relationship.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the related litera-
ture, section 3 presents the model and the theoretical results, section 4 presents the
empirical results, and section 5 concludes. The appendix discusses the numerical
method, derives analytical results, and presents some robustness checks.
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2 RELATIONSHIP TO THE LITERATURE
In the model structures of Krugman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) the
HME is a feature of the IRS-MC sectors and not of the CRS-PC sectors. This
distinction has been used to test the empirical merits of competing trade theories.
Davis and Weinstein find stronger evidence of the HME at the regional level (Davis
and Weinstein 1999) than at the international level (Davis and Weinstein 2003).
Head and Ries (2001) consider a model where, in addition to the outside good and
the IRS-MC good, there is also a CRS-PC good characterized by National Product
Differentiation a` la Armington (1969). In such model, the IRS-MC good exhibits
the HME while the Armington good does not. Using data for U.S. and Canadian
manufacturing they find evidence in support of both the IRS-MC and the Armington
market structure depending on wether within or between variations are considered.
Both Davis and Weinstein (1999 and 2003) and Head and Ries (2001) assume
the existence of an outside good. The first investigation on the consequences of
removing the outside good is found in Davis (1998). He eliminates the outside good
from the model in Helpman and Krugman (1985, Ch. 10) by introducing trade costs
in the CRS-PC good. His theoretical paper has shown that in the absence of an
outside good the HME may disappear. The HME disappears if and only if trade
costs in the CRS-PC good are sufficiently high to impede international trade in this
good. Does the HME survive and what shape does it take when trade costs in the
CRS-PC good are not high enough to impede trade in this good? This question,
which we address both theoretically and empirically in part of this paper, remains
unanswered in Davis (1998).
Other papers have addressed the issue of trade costs and international special-
ization without, however, focusing on the shape of the HME or on the validity of
the HME as discriminating criteria. In a theoretical paper, Amiti (1998) studies,
among other things, how the pattern of specialization and trade varies with country
size when industries have different trade costs. Laussel and Paul (2007), use a two-
sector model where the elasticity of substitution differs between industries. They
find that, if countries are close in size, a fall in transport costs from a prohibitive
level to zero is associated with a reversal in the pattern of trade at some interme-
diate level of trade costs. If the two countries are instead very different in size the
larger country is always a net exporter of the less differentiated good. Hanson and
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Xiang (2004) theoretically and empirically investigate the pattern of specialization
and trade in a model where a continuum of IRS-MC goods differ in terms of elas-
ticities of substitution and trade costs. Holmes and Stevens (2005) focus on how
the pattern of trade varies across industries that differ in technology when there are
equal trade costs in all sectors. While these papers address issues related to the one
in the present study, their focus is different from ours.2 The robustness of the HME
is the subject of investigation also in Head, Mayer and Ries (2002), yet with focus
on the role of market structure rather than on the role of the outside good. They
study the robustness of the HME to three different modeling assumptions concern-
ing the market structure: Cournot oligopoly and homogenous good, monopolistic
competition with linear demand, and Cournot oligopoly with national product dif-
ferentiation. They find that the first two types of market structure yield a linear
relationship between the share of production and the share of demand. The third
market structure, instead, give results that depend on the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods.3
3 THE MODEL
In this section we study the consequences that the absence of an outside good has on
the HME using a theoretical model. The model is characterized by the presence of
two goods: a good produced under IRS-MC, named M ; and a good produced under
CRS-PC, named A. The latter is differentiated by country of production a` la Arm-
ington (1969). For notational convenience we shall refer to this good as the CRS-
PC-A good. Individuals have the following two-tier utility function: U = MγA1−γ,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the expenditure share on good M . Good M is a CES aggre-
gate of all varieties of M produced in the world, M =
(∫
κ∈Ω (cMk)
σM−1
σM dk
) σM
σM−1
,
2Other papers have studied different manifestations of the HME while keeping the assumption
of the existence of an outside good whenever appropriate. Such papers include Weder (1995),
Lundba¨ck and Torstensson (1999), Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001), Trionfetti (2001), Weder
(2003), Yu (2005), and Bru¨lhart and Trionfetti (2005).
3In the third market structure, for intermediate and high values of the elasticity of substitution
there is no HME and the relationship between production and demand may be non-linear. The
model based on this market structure, however, is not suitable to address the question of the
robustness of the HME to the absence of the outside good since it does not predict the HME for
any value of parameters. Further, its structure makes it hardly comparable to the models most
widely used for theoretical and empirical purposes.
5
where Ω is the set of of all the varieties of M produced in the world, cMk is con-
sumption of variety k, and σM is the elasticity of substitution between any two
varieties. Good A is a CES aggregate of the domestic and foreign variety of A,
A =
(
(cA1)
σA−1
σA + (cA2)
σA−1
σA
) σA
σA−1
, where cAi is consumption of country i’s variety
of good A and σA is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and the for-
eign variety of A. Good A is produced under constant returns to scale and perfect
competition, there is an infinity of domestic producers and an infinity of foreign pro-
ducers. Consumers perceive the domestically produced A as different from foreign
A but they perceive as identical the output of two producers in the same country.
There is, therefore, product differentiation by country of production. That is, con-
sumers care about the “made in” label. In models of trade in the spirit of Helpman
and Krugman (1985) the CRS-PC good is assumed to be perfectly homogenous
internationally; thus, domestic and foreign A are perfect substitute. Assuming per-
fect substitutability and absence of the outside good gives the knife-edge result that
we derive in Section 3.2. We do not limit our investigation to the case of perfect
substitutability. We allow for a more general case where the domestic and foreign
CRS-PC goods are not perfect substitute. This slight generalization will allow us
to verify the robustness of the knife-edge results generated by the assumption of
perfect substitutability.
From utility maximization and aggregation over individuals in the same country
we have the following demand functions (the first subscript indicates the country
where the good is produced, the second subscript indicates the country where the
good is sold): mii = p
−σM
Mii P
σM−1
Mi γYi,mij = p
−σM
Mij P
σM−1
Mj γYj, aii = p
−σA
Aii P
σA−1
Ai (1− γ)Yi,
aij = p
−σA
Aij P
σA−1
Aj (1− γ)Yj; where mii and mij represent, respectively, domestic and
foreign residents’ demand for any of the domestic varieties of M ; similarly, aii and
aij represent, respectively, domestic and foreign residents’ demand for the domes-
tic production of A. Demand functions depend on prices and income: pMii and
pMij represent, respectively, the price in country i and j of a variety produced in
i; pAii and pAij represent, respectively, the price in i and j of good A produced in
i; PMi =
(∫
κ∈Ωi (piik)
1−σM dk +
∫
κ∈Ωj (pjik)
1−σM dk
) 1
1−σM is the CES price index
of M relevant for consumers in country i and Ωi is the set of varieties produced in
country i; PAi =
(
p1−σAAii + p
1−σA
Aji
) 1
1−σA is the CES price index of A relevant for
consumers in i; national income is Yi = wiLi, where wi and Li are, respectively, the
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wage and labor endowment in country i.
We assume iceberg transport costs in both sectors. Thus, τM ∈ (0, 1) and
τA ∈ (0, 1) represent for M and A, respectively, the fraction of one unit of good
sent that arrives at destination. It is convenient to define: φM ≡ τσM−1M ∈ (0, 1),
and φA ≡ τσA−1A ∈ (0, 1). Trade freeness in anyone sector increases when the value
of the corresponding phi increases.
Production technology of any variety of M exhibits increasing returns to scale.
The labor requirement per q units of output is: LM = F + aMq. The production
technology of A exhibits constant returns to scale. To save notation we assume that
one unit of labor input produces one unit of output of A. Profit maximization gives
the following optimal prices:
pAii = wi, pMii =
σM
σM − 1aMwi, i = 1, 2. (1)
pAij =
1
τA
pAii, pMij =
1
τM
pii, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2. (2)
The zero profit condition gives the firm’s optimal size, which turns out to be the
same in both countries and for all firms:
qi =
F
aM
(σM − 1), i = 1, 2. (3)
Using demand functions and Walras’ law the equilibrium conditions in the goods
market are:
pM11q1 =
p1−σMM11 γw1L1
p1−σMM11 n1 + φMp
1−σM
M22 n2
+
φMp
1−σM
M11 γw2L2
φMp
1−σM
M11 n1 + p
1−σM
M22 n2
(4)
pM22q2 =
φMp
1−σM
M22 γw1L1
p1−σMM11 n1 + φMp
1−σM
M22 n2
+
p1−σMM22 γw2L2
φMp
1−σM
M11 n1 + p
1−σM
M22 n2
(5)
pA11A1 =
p1−σAA11 (1− γ)w1L1
p1−σAA11 + φAp
1−σA
A22
+
φAp
1−σA
A11 (1− γ)w2L2
φAp
1−σA
A11 + p
1−σA
A22
(6)
Equilibrium conditions in labor markets are:
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L1 = A1 + n1 (F + aMq1) (7)
L2 = A2 + n2 (F + aMq2) (8)
The fifteen equations (1)-(8) determine the fifteen endogenous variables of the
model. These are the eight prices: pA11, pA12j, pA22, pA21, pM11, pM12, pM22, pM21;
firm’s optimal size in each country: q1, q2; the number of varieties of M produced in
each country: n1, n2; the production of A in each country, A1, A2, and the relative
wage ω ≡ w1
w2
. The exogenous variables include all parameters and - importantly
for our purposes - the size of countries measured by labor endowments, represented
by L1 and L2. It is convenient to make use of the following definitions of share
variables: SNi ≡ nin1+n2 , represents country i’s share of world production of M ;
SAi ≡ AiA1+A2 , represents country i’s share of world production of A; SLi ≡ LiL1+L2 ,
represents country i’s share of world endowment of labor; and SIi ≡ wiLiw1L1+w2L2
represents country i’s share of world expenditure (on any one good).
Models in the vein of Helpman and Krugman (1985, Ch. 10) predict a more than
proportional relationship between a country’s share of production and its share
of labor endowment, this is the HME, that is: dSNi
dSLi
> 1. They also predict a
less than proportional relationship between a country’s share of production and
its share of labor endowment for CRS-PC sectors, that is: dSAi
dSLi
∈ [0, 1). These
predictions obtain in the presence of an outside good. The contrast between the more
than proportional relationship in IRS-MC sectors and the less than proportional
relationship in the CRS-PC sectors constitutes a discriminating criterion usable for
testing trade theories. We want to verify whether the HME and the discriminating
criterion are robust to the absence of the outside good. To this purpose we compute
the derivatives dSNi
dSLi
and dSAi
dSLi
in our model. We do so for the two major cases used
in the empirical literature. First, we will assume that σA = σM . This assumption,
abstracting from the absence of an outside good in our model, brings us to the
framework used in Head and Ries (2001). Second, we will assume that σA 6= σM
and that σA = ∞. This assumption brings us exactly in the model developed in
Davis (1998).
The functional relationships we study always relate one of country i’s share
variables to country i’s share of labor endowment. Henceforth, we drop the subscript
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i since confusion does not arise.
3.1 Finite Elasticities (1 < σA = σM <∞)
We want to find out the shape of the functional relationship between the share
of production and the share of labor endowment in the incomplete specialization
set. This functional relationship cannot be obtained explicitly given the kind of
non linearity of the system composed by equations (1)-(8). We therefore obtain the
results by numerical exploration of the model. The numerical method is explained
in section 6.1 of the appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates the results. The figure shows the numerical solution for
the following parameter values: σA = σM ≡ σ = 7, γ = 3, τA = 0.6, τM = 0.8.
Naturally, the figure is representative of the pattern found on all the numerical
solutions. There are five functions plotted in the figure. To facilitate the visual
inspection we have exploited the symmetry of all functions around the symmetric
equilibrium and “zoomed” into the zone delimited by the sets [1/2, 1] and [1/2, 1]
on the abscissa and ordinates. All functions are plotted within the incomplete
specialization set (SL
is and SL
is
). Because of the “zooming”, Figure 1 shows only
the upper half of the incomplete specialization set. Only the upper bound of it,
SL
is
, is marked in the figure. We address the functions by descending order of slope.
The first function (represented by a dashed curve) shows the function SN (SL). The
second function (represented by a continuous straight line) is a linear function whose
slope at SL = 1/2 is the same as the slope of the dashed curve. Visual inspection,
taking account of the above-mentioned symmetry, shows that SN (SL) exhibits the
HME since its slope is larger than 1 everywhere within the incomplete specialization
set. Further, and more interestingly, the function SN (SL) is concave to the left of
1/2 (not shown in the figure), it has an inflexion at SL = 1/2 and it is convex to the
right of 1/2. The non-linearity is tenuous, however, as shown by the fact that the
dashed curve and the continuous straight line are almost indistinguishable at naked
eye. These result, which are found in all numerical solutions, can be summarized as
follows:
Result 1. When elasticities are finite, the absence of the outside good makes the
HME non-linear with shape concave-inflexion-convex; the non-linearity is tenuous,
however. We refer to this shape as the “smoothly non-linear HME”.
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Figure 1: Smoothly non-linear HME
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So far we have focused on the relationship between the real variables SN and (SL).
This is indeed at the center of our interest since we want to study the relationship
between a country’s relative size (measured by endowment) and its international
specialization (measured by relative size of physical output in each industry). How-
ever, the way the HME is usually understood is that a shock to a country’s share
of factor endowment generates a shock of the same sign to its share of expenditure
which, in turn, affects the share of physical output. This is indeed what happens in
our model and it is shown by the third function (represented by the dotted curve)
which shows the variable SI as function of SL: an increase in the country’s physical
endowment of labor causes an increase in its share of world expenditure (on any
good).4
Before passing to the next section we report that the shape of the function
4A brief discussion on wages is in order. The numerical exploration has shown that the wage
ratio ω may be increasing or decreasing in SL. However, SI is always increasing in SL. The
ambiguity on the sign of the slope of ω is the consequence of two opposite forces: the presence of
the M industry tends to give a positive slope (the largest country would have the largest wage)
but the presence of the A industry pushes wages in the opposite direction. Overall, even when
ω is decreasing in SL, its decline is not enough to outweigh the effect that an increase in SL has
on SI . The lowest dotted line in Figure 1 represent the nominal wage differential plotted for the
parameter values recalled above and shifted up by 1/2 so that it can be plotted in the same range
as the other functions (the function plotted is w1− w2 + 1/2).
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SA (SL), not shown in the figure, mirrors that of SN (SL) around the 45-degree line
in the entire incomplete specialization set. The function SA (SL) has shape “convex-
inflexion-concave” and its slope is always smaller than one.
3.2 Perfect substitutability in the CRS-PC good (σA =∞)
When good A is perfectly homogenous internationally the resulting model is exactly
as in Davis (1998). The major finding of Davis’ paper is that the HME disappears
when trade costs in A are sufficiently high to eliminate trade in that good. Our
focus is to study the shape of SN (SL) when trade costs are not sufficiently high to
eliminate trade in A. This aspect remains unexplored in Davis’s paper. In section
6.2. of the appendix we obtain explicit solutions for the model. The logic of the
results is simple, however. When trade costs in A as sufficiently large, industry M
cannot expand more than proportionally because industry A cannot release labor.
Industry A cannot release labor because, if there is no trade in A, domestic produc-
tion of A must satisfy domestic demand. In the absence of trade in A, a country’s
share of production of A must be proportional to its share of demand. Consequently,
the country’s share of production of M must also be proportional to its share of de-
mand. When trade in A occurs there is HME in M . The reason is that industry A
no longer needs to satisfy domestic demand (good A can be imported) and therefore
it can release labor to industryM , which can expand more than proportionally. The
existence of the HME in this model, therefore, depends crucially on whether trade
costs in A are high enough to eliminate trade in this good. The sufficient condition
for the HME to exist is τA > τ
σM−1
σM
M .
Figure 2 shows the results. The dashed broken line represents the function
SN (SL) resulting from the explicit solution of the model (plotted for σM = 3,
τM = 0.7, τA = 0.9). Again, because of the zooming we see only the upper half of
all functions and sets. The figure shows that the relationship between SN and SL
is perfectly proportional in the set
(
SL, SL
)
. There is no HME in this set. Instead,
there is HME for values of SL in
(
SL
is, SL
)
- not shown in the figure - and in
(SL, SL
is
). The relationship between SN and SL is more than proportional in these
sets. Further, the more than proportional bit of SN (SL) in
(
SL
is, SL
)
is concave
- not shown in the figure. Instead, the more than proportional bit of SN (SL) in
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Figure 2: Piecewise non-linear HME
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) is convex.5 We can summarize the result as follows:
Result 2. When σA = ∞ and when there is trade in A the HME is non-linear
with shape “concave-linear-convex”. We refer to this shape as the “piecewise non-
linear HME”.
The dotted broken line in Figure 2 shows the nominal wage differential shifted up
by 1/2 so that it can be plotted in the same range as the other functions (the function
plotted is w1−w2+1/2). The wage differential is an increasing function of SL in the
set (SL, SL). Instead, the wage differential is flat in (SL
is, SL), and (SL, SL
is
). This
shape of the wage differential (which obtains for any value of parameter) implies
that an increase in the share of labor endowment causes an increase in the share of
expenditure. The function SI (SL) - not plotted in Figure 2 - is therefore increasing
in SL.
The shape of the function SA (SL), not shown in the figure, mirrors that of
SN (SL) around the 45-degree line in the entire incomplete specialization set. The
function SA (SL) has shape ”convex-linear-concave” and its slope is always smaller
than one.
5The curvatures are invisible graphically but can be demonstrated analytically.
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An increase of trade costs in A relative to M expands symmetrically the set(
SL, SL
)
which then covers a larger sub-set of (0, 1). If trade costs in A are suf-
ficiently high the set
(
SL, SL
)
coincides with (0, 1) and the HME disappears com-
pletely.
Before passing to the empirical part it is convenient to mention that the model
presented above, like other models in the same spirit, predicts that higher elasticities
of substitution and higher trade costs attenuate the Home Market Effect. Moreover,
higher elasticities of substitution and higher trade costs make also the Home Market
Effect more linear. These predictions are not at the heart of our investigation and,
for reason of space, we do not provide a demonstration but we will refer to them in
the empirical section below.
4 EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
The model examined in the previous section gives the following prediction: removing
the outside good makes the HME non linear by either giving it the smooth shape
(Figures 1) or the piecewise shape (Figure 2). The HME is weaker (if it exists at
all) nearer the symmetric equilibrium than away from it. Therefore, its impact is
bigger for countries whose demand shares are very different from the world average
than for countries whose demand shares are near the world average.
These results can be verified empirically by analyzing the relationship between
countries’ production shares and demand shares. In this section we estimate the
effect of each demand deviation from the sample average on the corresponding pro-
duction deviation for a large set of countries and industries.
4.1 Variables and data
The empirical investigation of the model requires reliable measures of demand and
production deviations by countries and industries.
Let xikt denote the quantity of good k produced in country i at date t. The
supply deviation in country i for product k at time t is:
∆S,ikt =
xikt∑R
i=1 xikt
− 1
R
,
13
where R is the number of countries. ∆S,ikt is positive if the production of good
k in country i is greater than the mean value of the sample, and negative otherwise.
To be consistent with the theoretical model, we measure ∆S,ikt in terms of quantity
of production. We proxy the quantities by xikt = Xikt/pikt, where Xikt is the value
of production of good k in country i at date t and pikt is the price of that production.
The demand deviation variable, ∆D,ikt, is defined similarly:
∆D,ikt =
Dikt/pikt∑R
i=1 (Dikt/pikt)
− 1
R
.
The variable Dikt captures the demand potentially addressed to producers of
good k in country i. It is the value of demand emanating from all countries for
good k produced in country i at date t. It is computed as the sum of sectoral
expenditures in all locations weighted by accessibility to consumers.6 Denoting
with Ejkt the expenditure on good k in country j and with Φijkt a measure of trade
freeness, we have: Dikt =
∑R
j=1ΦijktEjkt.
An important issue for empirical investigation lies in the measurement of trade
freeness represented by the parameter Φijkt. We use here the same estimate of trade
barriers as Head and Ries (2001). Starting from the theoretical demands expressed
on foreign and domestic markets, and assuming symmetric bilateral trade freeness
and free trade within countries, they obtain the following proxy for Φijkt:
ΦHRijkt =
√
zijktzjikt
ziiktzjjkt
,
where zijkt is the value of the trade flow of good k, from i to j at year t and
ziikt is country i’s imports from itself. The index Φ
HR
ijkt ranges from 0 to 1, with 1
denoting free trade.7
The measure of trade freeness proposed by Head and Ries (2001) has three main
qualities. First, ΦHRijkt is time-dependent, so that it controls for the potential changes
in access to market due to trade liberalization processes. Second, ΦHRijkt encompasses
all possible sources of bilateral trade barriers, besides trade frictions associated to
geographical distances and other usual gravity inputs. Third, ΦHRijkt does not impose
6Davis and Weinstein (2003) call this variable the “Derived Demand”, and Head and Mayer
(2006) refer to it as the “Nominal Market Potential”.
7Head and Mayer (2004) discuss further this index. Alternatively, Davis and Weinstein (2003)
use the coefficients of a gravity equation to compute a proxy for Φijkt.
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any strict assumption on bilateral trade relation and fits specifically to each country-
pair. This is very important for the purpose of this paper; since we are looking for
nonlinearity in the HME relation, we have to make sure that our measure of access
to market does not introduce a bias that especially affects outlier trading countries.
The empirical investigation of the model requires compatible data of production
and demand at the sectoral level. Moreover, we need bilateral trade data for the
corresponding products and countries in order to compute ΦHRijkt. We use the trade
and production database provided by CEPII. This database uses the source (BACI)
and the source OECD-STAN to expand the trade and production database compiled
by the World Bank.8 The CEPII’s trade and production database provides figures
on sectoral production, prices, total exports and imports, and bilateral trade for a
large set of industries (ISIC-Rev. 2) and countries, over 25 years (1976-2001). For
each country and sector, intra-national trade is computed as the difference between
country’s sectoral production and its aggregate sectoral exports to all other nations.
Similarly, domestic expenditure is the sum of this non-exported production and the
sectoral imports from the rest of the world. Missing values forced us to eliminate
some countries and industries. The resulting data set reduced to a balanced 25
countries and 25 industries data set over the period 1990-1996.9
4.2 Pooled results: the shape of the HME
We begin by showing the empirical evidence on the pooled sample. These pooled
tests give an informative outline of the patterns of the HME and allow some direct
comparisons with previous research.
Figure 3 plots ∆S,ikt against ∆D,ikt for the 25 industries and the 25 countries
for the year 1996. As expected, we observe that greater demand deviations increase
production deviations more than proportionately (the fitted line has a slope of 1.19).
8See Mayer and Zignago (2005) for details on the database. The trade and production database
we use is available at www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm. The BACI database, com-
piled at CEPII, is available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.htm . The OECD-STAN
database originates from both COMTRADE and UNIDO.
9We have eliminated only three industries from the original database (Furniture except metal,
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products and Pottery, china and earthenware). The 25 coun-
tries, which account for more than 78% of world GDP and about 70% of world trade, are: Austria,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United King-
dom, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Netherlands, Philippines, Portugal, Sweden,
Taiwan, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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Figure 3: Demand deviations and production deviations (1996)
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Moreover, most observations with the largest positive demand deviations are above
the fitted line, whereas the observations with the smallest demand deviations are
mainly below the fitted line. This visual inspection confirms our theoretical predic-
tion. We now move to the use of econometric techniques to rigorously verify the
presence of the non-linearity.
We estimate the following equation:
∆S,ikt = α1∆D,ikt + α2∆D,ikt.|∆D,ikt|. (9)
The estimation of equation (9) gives all the information we need in order to infer
the shape of the relationship between share of production and share of demand.
Recall that, by definition, the mean value of ∆S,ikt and ∆D,ikt is zero. If the estimated
α2 is positive, then negative demand deviations make the shape concave whereas
positive demand deviations make the shape convex. Exactly the opposite applies
if α2 is negative.
10 Thus, the estimated values of the coefficients α1 and α2 can
10Equation (9) has the following functional form: y = α1(x − 12 ) + α2(x − 1R )|x − 1R |. The
first derivative is: α1 + α2(x − 1R )sign(x − 1R ) + α2|x − 1R |. It is apparent that α1 is the least
value of the first derivative. Therefore, if the estimated value of α1 is larger than 1, the slope
of the production-demand relationship is larger than 1 everywhere. The second derivative is:
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be associated precisely with different shapes of the production-demand relationship
and with different market structures. Indeed, α1 ≥ 1 and α2 ≥ 0 gives a piecewise
(α1 = 1) or a smooth (α1 > 1) HME, characterizing IRS-MC industries, while
α1 ≤ 1 and α2 ≤ 0 gives the less than proportional relationship expected for the A
industries.
Table 1: Pooled regressions
Dependent Variable: ∆S (production deviation) - OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆D,ikt 1.189>1 1.146>1 1.369>1 1.151>1 1.316>1 1.118>1
(0.018) (0.021) (0.073) (0.020) (0.053) (0.022)
∆D,ikt.|∆D,ikt| 0.261b 0.2227c 2.397a 0.413a 1.701a
(0.128) (0.117) (0.595) (0.152) (0.868)
σk. (∆D,ikt) -0.090b
(0.025)
σk. (∆D,ikt.|∆D,ikt|) -0.911b
(0.238)
(1/τk). (∆D,ikt) -0.041a
(0.010)
(1/τk). (∆D,ikt.|∆D,ikt|) -0.256a
(0.064)
Nb. Obs. 4375 4375 4375 4375 4375 4375
R2 0.862 0.862 0.865 0.868 0.867 0.868
Notes: ∆D is the computed derived demand deviation. Robust standard error in parentheses.
a, b, c: Respectively significant at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels. =1, >1: Significant at the
1% level, and respectively equal and greater than one at the 5% level.
Table 1 displays the OLS estimates of equation (9) on the pooled sample (i.e.
for the 25*25*7=4375 observations). Column (1) presents a benchmark estimation
assuming a simple linear relationship between ∆D,ikt and ∆S,ikt. As expected, the
coefficient is positive and greater than one, which indicates the presence of a signif-
icant Home Market Effect. Moreover, the coefficient value of 1.189 is of comparable
magnitude to those obtained by Head and Ries (2001) in the case of the between
y′′ = α2[2sign(x− 1R ) + (2x− 1)Dirac(x− 1R )]. If α2 is positive, then y′′ Q 0 for x Q 1R , therefore
the function is concave for x < 1/R, it has an inflection at x = 1/R, and it is convex for x > 1/R.
The sign of y′′ and the shape of the curvature are reversed if α2 is negative. If α2 = 0 the function
is linear everywhere.
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estimates. Hence, production rises, on average, by almost 1.2% when demand devi-
ation rises by 1%. But the main object of our interest is the estimated value of α2
in equation (9). This result is shown in column (2). The introduction of the second
term reduces the estimated value of α1. Further, the coefficient α2 is unambiguously
positive. These estimates indicate that the relationship between demand shares and
production shares is smoothly non-linear for the typical industry in the sample. Like
in Figure 1, the Home Market Effect is always present, but its strength increases
with the absolute size of demand deviations. In the appendix we show that these
results are robust to various estimation methods and variable definitions.
We conclude this section by verifying the effect of the elasticity of substitution
and of trade costs on the intensity of the HME. We expect that higher elasticities
of substitution and higher trade costs attenuate the Home Market Effect, which is
tested in columns (3) to (6).
In column (3) and (4) we interact a sectoral measure of the elasticity of substi-
tution (σk) with ∆D,ikt and ∆D,ikt.|∆D,ikt| respectively.11 The sectoral proxy for σk
is derived from Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimates. Broda and Weinstein (2006)
provide import demand elasticities for SITC Rev.3 3-digit products; we aggregate
this data at the ISIC Rev.2 level, taking the median value of their estimates. In
column (3), the interaction term coefficient is negative and the estimate for α1 is
smaller compared with the estimate shown in column (2). This result confirms that
the HME is larger on average for highly differentiated products. A comparable result
is presented in column (4). The interaction term between σk and (∆D,ikt.|∆D,ikt|) is
negative, and its inclusion in the regression increases the estimate for α2 leaving un-
changed α1. This supports also our theoretical framework, showing that industries
characterized by a large σk exhibit a more linear Home Market Effect. Columns (5)
and (6) display estimations with interaction terms between the demand deviations
variables and a proxy for (1/τk). We compute this proxy using the NBER U.S. im-
port data complied by Feenstra et al. (2002), which reports freight charges rates at
the product level. For each industry, our proxy for sectoral trade cost is the median
value across U.S. trading partners of import freight rates. As for columns (3) and
(4), the results are consistent with the theoretical prediction. The coefficients on
interaction terms are significantly negative, which suggests that higher transport
11Introducing both interaction terms simultaneously gives rise to multicollinearity.
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cost attenuates both the mean shape of the HME and its curvature.
4.3 Results by industry: structural changes in the HME
Table 2: Simple HME test - structural breakpoints
β1 β2 pi % of obs. for which
ExtremeDevpi=1
Pooled 1.06>1 1.21>1 960 obs. 21.9%
Industry (ISIC)
Food prod. (311) 1.01=1 1.10>1 16 obs. 9.1%
Beverages (313) 1.05>1 1.00=1 44 obs. 25.1%
Tobacco (314) 0.98=1 1.18>1 16 obs. 9.1%
Textiles (321) 1.48>1 1.25>1 120 obs. 68.6%
Wearing app. (322) 1.03=1 0.93a 56 obs.[ 32.0%
Leather prod. (323) 1.61>1 1.14=1 136 obs. 77.7%
Footwear (324) 1.11=1 0.38a 12 obs. 6.9%
Wood prod. (331) 0.98=1 1.12>1 16 obs. 9.1%
Paper & prod. (341) 1.00=1 1.22>1 28 obs. 16.0%
Printing (342) 1.05>1 1.06>1 16 obs. 9.1%
Indus. chemicals (351) 1.14>1 1.67>1 32 obs. 18.3%
Other chemicals (352) 1.18>1 1.27>1 20 obs. 11.4%
Petroleum (353) 1.00=1 1.15>1 16 obs. 9.1%
Rubber prod. (355) 1.10>1 1.22>1 48 obs.[ 27.4%
Plastic prod. (356) 1.28>1 1.10>1 140 obs. 80.0%
Glass & prod. (362) 1.04=1 1.33>1 36 obs. 20.6%
Other mineral prod. (369) 1.15>1 1.03>1 140 obs. 80.0%
Iron & steel (371) 1.44>1 1.20>1 136 obs. 77.7%
Other metals (372) 1.01=1 1.36>1 12 obs. 6.9%
Metal prod. (381) 1.11>1 1.21>1 44 obs. 24.1%
Non-elec. machinery (382) 1.087=1 1.70>1 32 obs. 18.3%
Electric machinery (383) 0.84=1 1.66>1 28 obs. 16.1%
Transport equip. (384) 1.02=1 1.41>1 28 obs. 16.1%
Professional equip. (385) 0.72=1 2.62>1 16 obs. 9.1%
Other manuf. (390) 0.77a 1.42>1 32 obs. 18.3%
Notes: a: significant at the 1% level. =1, >1: Significant at the 1% level, and respectively
equal and greater than one at the 5% level. [: Breakpoint is not significant at the 10%
level. Italics denote industries that exhibit a piecewise HME
We recall that the HME (if it exists) is stronger away from the symmetric equi-
librium than near it. Sectoral estimations serve the principal purpose of verifying
empirically this result for each industry. To this purpose, we test for parameter
structural change in a simple linear HME estimation. In addition, this estimation
allows also to identify the type of non-linearity characterizing each individual sector.
We perform maximum-Wald tests, using the following equation:
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∆S,ikt = β1(1− ExtremeDevpi)∆D,ikt + β2(ExtremeDevpi)∆D,ikt, (10)
where ExtremeDevpi is a dummy variable that equals one if ∆D,ikt belongs to the
pi/2 smallest or the pi/2 greatest values in the sample and zero otherwise. We test
β1 6= β2 performing Wald tests for several values of pi, then we consider the larger
value of Wald statistic as the most significant break point.12 Hence, the estimated
critical value of pi splits the data into three sub-groups: a group of observations that
have small values of derived demand deviations, a group of large derived demand
deviations, and a group of intermediate derived demand deviations. The two groups
of extreme values of demand deviations are of identical size and we assume that the
HME is of identical magnitude for both of them. The smaller is the estimated
value of pi the smaller is the size of these two groups of observations. The first
three columns of Table 2 report the estimated values of β1 and β2 and the critical
values of pi. The last column reports the percentage of observations for which
ExtremeDevpi = 1, that is the observations for which the slope is equal to β2.
The first row of Table 2 shows the results for the pooled data.13 We see that
β2 > β1 > 1, which suggests that HME matters for all countries though more
strongly for extreme values of demand deviations. This is consistent with the smooth
non-linearity found in the pooled estimation of equation (9).
The remaining lines of Table 2 report the results for each individual industry.14
Two industries (Footwear and Wearing apparels) can be associated to the CRS-
PC paradigm. Footwear exhibits a smooth inverted HME (β1 ≤ 1 and β2 < β1),
but results for Wearing apparels are more ambiguous since the maximum-Wald
test does not identify a significant breakpoint. Seven industries provide unexpected
results. For six of them (Beverage, Textile, Leather, Plastics, Other mineral products,
and Iron and steel) both β1 and β2 are larger than one, but β1 > β2. These
industries clearly exhibit a significant Home Market Effect but do not fit in any
of the cases identified in the theoretical model. For Other manufacturing products
the results are cannot be interpreted using the model: β1 < 1 but β2 > 1. The
other sixteen industries show results consistent with the IRS-MC paradigm. Four
12See Andrews (1993, 2003).
13We increase pi from 20 to 2000, using steps of 20 observations.
14There are 175 observations for each of the 25 industries. We perform 42 regressions for each
of them with pi ranking from 4 to 172 with steps of 4 observations.
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of them (Printing, Industrial chemicals, Other chemicals and Metal products) show
a smooth HME (β2 > β1 > 1), and one (Rubber) exhibits a linear HME. Finally,
for the eleven remaining industries econometric results give evidence in favor of a
piecewise HME (β2 > β1 = 1).
The eleven industries exhibiting a piecewise HME represent more than 62% of
manufacturing production in our sample. Moreover, for all of them, the correspond-
ing threshold values of pi are rather small: the percentage of observations for which
ExtremeDevpi = 1 ranges from 9.1% to 20.6% and is 12.5% on average. This means
that the Home Market Effect influences the specializations in 62% of the manufac-
turing activity of only about 12.5% of the countries on average.
5 CONCLUSION
We have eliminated the outside good from the model that used the HME to test
trade theories. Our theoretical results confirm that the discriminating criterion
based on the HME is robust to such model modification except in the special case
of perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign production of the CRS-
PC good combined with prohibitive trade costs for this good. This special case is
never observed at the level of industry aggregation normally used in the empirical
literature. It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the HME remains a valid
criterion with which to test trade theories. The robustness of the HME has another
important implication. It implies that the outside good assumption, although clearly
at odds with reality, does not affect qualitatively the results concerning international
specialization and the direction of trade. Therefore, its pervasive use is justifiable
on the ground of algebraic convenience. However, in the absence of the outside
good, the HME is attenuated and may disappear in a subset of the incomplete
specialization set. This is important because it implies that all results hinging
on the HME (results concerning specialization, but also welfare results) should be
taken with same caution since their actual magnitude is probably smaller than
what is predicted by models which assume an outside good. Finally, the HME
is found to be non linear. The non-linearity implies that the home market effect
is more important for countries whose demand deviations are very different from
the average than for countries whose demand deviations are close to the average.
Therefore, the consequences of small demand shocks (be it due to preference shocks
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or to public policy) are likely to have a much smaller (if any) impact on international
specialization than what is predicted by models that assume an outside good.
Our empirical investigation strongly supports the non-linearity in both pooled
and sectoral regressions. We find evidence of non-linearity in 16 sectors out of
25. Five of them exhibit the smooth non-linearity and eleven of them show the
piecewise non-linear HME. The latter result tells us that although the HME exists,
its economic importance is limited since it influences the specialization of a small
number of countries (about 12.5 % of the sample).
We conclude by pointing at one other related issue concerning trade costs and
the HME. The HME derived in the two-country model with outside good extends
to the many-country model (with outside good) if it is assumed that countries are
equidistant but it does not (in general) if countries are not equidistant. Behrens
et al. (2004) explore this issue in great detail while keeping the assumption of the
existence of an outside good that equalizes wages and offsets all trade imbalances.
We have limited our analysis to the the two-country case but have complicated
matters by eliminating the outside good. Ideally, one would like to see a tractable
model with many non-equidistant countries and without the outside good, but this
proves to be beyond mathematical tractability for the time being.
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6 APPENDIX15
6.1 Finite Elasticities: results from numerical methods
We want to find out the shape of the function SN(SL). We start by solving system
(1)-(8) for 3,645 (93 · 5) different sets of parameters values. Each set consists of dif-
ferent values assigned to the four parameters (σ, γ, τA, τM). We have set σ equal to
3, 4, 5, 7, and 8.16 For each of these values of sigma we let the other parameters take
all possible combinations of values at intervals of 0.1 (nine values for each param-
eter). We then approximate the function SN(SL) with the third-degree polynomial
p (SL) =
3∑
i=0
ci (SL)
i for each of the 3,645 different set of parameter values.17 We use
Chebyshev interpolation method which greatly outperforms Lagrange interpolation
(see Judd, 1998). The approximation method gives the coefficients of p (SL) which,
through use of simple calculus, give us the shape of the unknown function. In fact,
the first derivative of the polynomial is larger than one for any SL if c1− 13 (c2)
2
c3
> 1.
All simulations gave values of c1 − 13 (c2)
2
c3
larger than one. Therefore SN(SL), as ap-
proximated by p (SL) is increasing in SL and its slope is larger than one in the entire
incomplete specialization set. The second derivative of the polynomial is positive,
zero, or negative as SL is larger, equal, or smaller than −13 c2c3 . Thus, the function is
concave (convex) for values of SL smaller (larger) than −13 c2c3 and it has an inflexion
point at SL = −13 c2c3 . Using the coefficients of the approximating polynomial the
inflexion point is found at SL ' 1/2 in all simulations (the greatest deviations from
1/2 occur at the sixth decimal digit). Therefore, SN(SL) has the shape represented
in Figure 1 in all the 3,645 simulations.
15Maple files associated with the mathematical appendix are available at: http://team.univ-
paris1.fr/teamperso/crozet/matthieu.htm.
16These values of sigma are often used in numerical explorations of this class of models and
are comparable to those resulting from gravity equation estimation. For instance, Head and Ries
(2001) find a sigma equal to 7.9, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) find it equal to 6.43, Head and
Mayer (2005) find it equal to 8, Hanson (2005) finds it equal to 4.9, and Broda and Weinstein
(2006) find it equal to 4 among three-digit goods.
17Using a polynomial of a higher degree would increase the precision of approximation but would
not give further qualitative information about the shape of the function SN (SL). We therefore
stay with the most parsimonious way of obtaining the qualitative information.
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6.2 Perfect substitutability in the CRS-PC good: analytical
results
Since good A is homogenous across countries, consumers have a single demand for
A instead of separate demands for each country’s variety of A. This demand is:
ai = (1− γ)Yi/pAi , where pAi is the domestic price of A.18 We assume γ < 1/2 so
that the largest country produces both goods for any SL.
When there is trade in A we have either pA1 =
1
τA
pA2 (if country 1 is the importer
of A) or pA2 =
1
τA
pA1 (if country 1 is the exporter of A). Either one of these two
equations, plus (1)-(5) and (7)-(8), determine the fifteen endogenous. In particular,
when country 1 is the importer of A we have:
SN(right) =
φ2M τ
σ+1
A −τAφM+SL(τσA−φM+τAφM−φ2M τσ+1A )
τσA−τAφM−φM τ2σA +φ2M τσ+1A +SL(τAφM−φM+φM τ2σA −φM τ2σ−1A +φ2M τσ−1A −φ2M τσ+1A )
, for
any SL ∈
(
SL, S
is
L
)
.
When country 1 is the exporter of A we have:
SN(left) = − (−τ
2
AφM+τAφM−φ2MφA+τAφM)SL+φ2MφA−τAφM
(φ2MφA+τ2AφM−τAφM−τ2Aφ2MφA+τAφMφ2A−φMφ2A)SL−φ2MφA−τAφA+τAφM+φ2AφM
,
for any SL ∈
(
SisL , SL
)
.
When there is no trade in A, domestic demand of Amust be satisfied by domestic
supply. Therefore, the market equilibrium conditions for A are:
A1 = (1− γ)L1 (11)
A2 = (1− γ)L2 (12)
The system composed of (1)-(4), plus (7)-(8) and (11)-(12) determines the fifteen
endogenous. In particular, we have that SN = SL. Summing up, we have the
following piecewise relationship:
SN =

SN(left), for any SL ∈
(
SisL , SL
)
SL, for any SL ∈ [SL, SL]
SN(right), for any SL ∈
(
SL, S
is
L
) (13)
This is the expression plotted in Figure 2 for σ = 3, τA = 9, and τM = 7).
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18The subscript i to the A good now refers to the price or the output of that good in country i
and not, as in the Armington model, to the price or quantity of country i’s variety of A. Since σA
equals infinity we drop the subscript from σM to lighten notation.
19The expressions for SA(right) and SA(left) are found analogously. To show the HME it suffices to
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The set (SL,SL) is found by substituting first
pA1
pA2
= w1
w2
= 1/τA, then
pA1
pA2
= τA
in (4) or (5) and solving for SL. This gives, respectively:
SL =
1− τσAτσ−1M
τσ−1A
(
τσA − τσ−1M
)
+ 1− τσAτσ−1M
∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
if τA > τ
σ−1
σ
M . (14)
SL = 1− 1− τ
σ
Aτ
σ−1
M
τσ−1A
(
τσA − τσ−1M
)
+ 1− τσAτσ−1M
∈
[
0,
1
2
]
if τA > τ
σ−1
σ
M . (15)
Solving the inequality SL < 1 or SL > 0 for τA gives τA > τ
σ−1
σ
M . If this inequality
is satisfied then there is trade in A. Solving SN(right) = 1 and SN(left) = 0 for SL
gives, respectively, the upper and lower bound of the incomplete specialization set:
S
is
L =
φMτ
1+σ
A − τA
−τA + φ2M − φMτσA + φMτσ+1A
∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
if τA > τ
σ−1
σ
M . (16)
SisL = 1−
φMτ
1+σ
A − τA
−τA + φ2M − φMτσA + φMτσ+1A
∈
(
0,
1
2
)
if τA > τ
σ−1
σ
M . (17)
6.3 Pooled regressions: Robustness checks
Table 3 presents several of robustness checks of the result presented in Table 1.
Table 3: Pooled regressions - Robustness tests
Dependent Variable: ∆S (production deviation) - OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Values OECD ΦGijk
∆D 1.168>1 1.131>1 1.146>1 1.145>1 1.053>1
(0.021) (0.025) (0.014) (0.014) (0.022)
∆D.|∆D| 0.310b 0.081 0.261a 0.268a 0.658c
(0.133) (0.129) (0.074) (0.075) (0.374)
Fixed Effect No No Year Indus. No
Nb. Obs. 4375 2800 4375 4375 4375
R2 0.880 0.879 * * 0.507
Notes: SD is the computed derived demand deviation.
a, b, c: Respectively signif-
icant at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels. =1, >1: Significant at the 1% level, and
respectively equal and greater than one at the 5% level. Robust standard er-
rors in parentheses. ∗ We constrain the sum of the fixed effects to be equal to
zero; R2 are not calculated.
take the derivatives of dSN(right)dSL and
dSN(left)
dSL
. It is easily verified that, if τA = 1, then SN(rigth) =
SN(left) = 12 +
1+φM
1−φM
(
SL − 12
)
exactly as in Helpman-Krugman (1985).
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Column (1) reports the estimates of the model using values of production and
demand rather than volumes. In column (2), we show the estimates obtained from
the database restricted to OECD countries. Columns (3) and (4) display the es-
timates with year and industry fixed effects respectively. Finally, in column (5),
we consider an alternative mesure of trade freeness, Φijkt. As Davis and Weinstein
(2003), we first perform a gravity estimation for each industry; then the coefficients
of this regression are used to compute the bilateral trade barrier, ΦGijk.
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